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INTRODUCTION
Investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS") has been put through the
ringer in recent public comment as a system that "threatens domestic
sovereignty by empowering foreign corporations to bypass domestic ourt
systems" and "weakens the rule of law."' One such foreign corporation is
Philip Morris Asia Limited ("Philip Morris Asia"), which brought a claim
against Australia in 2012 for compensation based on the state's cigarette
2packaging legislation. The case, along with Philip Morris's similar case
* Michael D. Nolan is a partner in the Washington, DC office of Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy and a member of the firm's Litigation & Arbitration Group.
1. Letter from Professor Erwin Chermerinsky ET AL., to Senator Mitch
McConnell ET AL., Mar. 11, 2015 (letter to United States Congressional leaders signed
by nearly 100 law and policy professors) [hereinafter "Chermerinsky Letter"].
2. See generally Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015).
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against Uruguay, created global controversy over states' ability to regulate
in the public interest.3 Some critics argued that the cases created a "chilling
effect" on other states that were considering similar tobacco regulation.4
On December 17, 2015, Australia defeated the multibillion dollar claim
when the arbitral tribunal declined jurisdiction over the matter. In response
to the tribunal's award, Philip Morris International Inc.'s ("Philip Morris")
general counsel appeared to respond to the controversy: "This case has
never been about a government's undeniable authority to regulate in the
public interest."5 Nevertheless, the vocal critics of the Philip Morris cases
are among many who question whether the ISDS system interferes with
democratic regulatory authority.
This Article will describe how the Philip Morris case falls within
criticism against the ISDS system over the past decade. Next, the Article
will compare similar ideas voiced in the current public debate about the
negotiations of the Trans Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership. Finally, this Article will assert that the ISDS
system will survive in the face of criticism as states begin to reform their
ISDS systems.
II. ISDS CRITICISM
A. Philip Morris Asia v. Australia
The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 became law in Australia on
December 1, 2011.6 Among other requirements, the law mandated certain
health warnings and limited branding on cigarette packages.7 On June 27,
2011, Philip Morris Asia filed a Notice of Claim against Australia pursuant
to the Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty (1993) ("Hong
Kong-Australia BIT"). 8 This claim was the first ISDS dispute that was
3. See Sebastian Perry, Australia Defeats Claim over Tobacco Policy, GLOBAL
ARB. REv. (Dec. 18, 2015) (subscription required).
4. Id.
5. Philip Morris Asia Limited Comments on Tribunal's Decision to Decline
Jurisdiction in Arbitration Against Commonwealth of Australia Over Plain Packaging,
BUSINEsSWrRE (Dec. 17, 2015, 7:34PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20
151217006627/en/Philip-Morris-Asia-Limited-Comments-TribunalE2%80%99s-
Decision.
6. See Tobacco plain packaging-investor-state arbitration, AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, https://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccopl
ainpackaging (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
7. See Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v.
Uruguay: Will Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing Up
in Smoke?, IISD (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-
uruguay-will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-
smoke/.
8. See supra note 6. See generally Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA
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brought against Australia.9 Philip Morris Asia argued that Australia's
tobacco plain packaging measure constituted an expropriation of its
Australian investments in breach of the BIT.' Philip Morris Asia further
argued that Australia's tobacco plain packaging measure was in breach of
its commitment under Article 2(2) of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, which
required fair and equitable treatment to Philip Morris Asia's investments."I
Finally, Philip Morris Asia asserted that tobacco plain packaging
constitutes an unreasonable and discriminatory measure and that Philip
Morris Asia's investments have been deprived of full protection and
security in breach of Article 2(2) of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT. 12
The arbitration was conducted under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules 2010. The
tribunal hearing the case was composed of three arbitrators: Australia
appointed Professor Don McRae of the University of Ottawa as an
arbitrator; Philip Morris Asia appointed Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler as an arbitrator; and the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration appointed Professor Dr. Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel as the
presiding arbitrator.'3 Over the course of four years, Australia and Philip
Morris submitted full statements of claims and defense.'4 On December
17, 2015, the tribunal declined jurisdiction over Philip Morris's claims.'
5
On May 16, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration published a redacted
version of the award in the Case Repository of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. 16
Before its arbitral positions were vindicated in this first investor-state
case against it, Australia had distanced itself from ISDS. In fact, Australia
categorically rejected the inclusion of ISDS provisions in a bilateral
investment treaty ("BIT"). 17 In 2011, the Australian Government issued a
Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Claim (June 27, 2011).
9. See supra note 6.
10. Philip Morris Asia Ltd., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Claim, 10(a).
11. See id. 10(b); see also Agreement between the Government of Australia and
the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art
2(2), H.K.-Aust., Sept. 15, 1993, 1784 U.N.T.S. 385 [hereinafter Hong Kong-Australia
BIT].
12. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Claim, 10(c);
see also Hong Kong-Australia BIT supra note 11; supra note 6.
13. See supra note 6.
14. See Perry, supra note 3.
15. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 588 (Dec. 17, 2015).
16. See Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Tribunal Publishes
Redacted Version of Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (May 16, 2016) (on file
at https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1713).
17. See The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.econo
2016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSNESS LA WREVIEW
Trade Policy Statement, which stated the country would not agree to ISDS
in future treaties.18 Since then, however, the Australian government has
stated that it will consider ISDS provisions on a "case-by-case" basis-a
policy which it appears to have carried out. Australia included ISDS in the
2014 Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement but not in the 2014 Australia-
Japan Free Trade Agreement.
19
B. Criticism before Philip Morris Asia v. Australia
Criticism of ISDS began with some South American states in the late
2000s. In 2007, these states began withdrawing their membership in the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") as a
result of a number of investor-state arbitrations filed against them. On May
2, 2007, Bolivia became the first to withdraw from ICSID by submitting a
Notice under Article 71 of the Washington Convention.20 Ecuador
followed with its own withdrawal on July 5, 2009, and Venezuela withdrew
on January 24, 2012.21 Following their respective withdrawals from
ICSID, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have each terminated at least
some of their existing BITs, and the three countries have not signed any
22new investment agreements.
mist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-
protect-foreign-investors-arbitration. The Australia-New Zealand Investment Protocol
and Malaysian Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") provide for resolution before local
courts.
18. See Jurgen Kurtz, The Australian Trade Policy Statement on Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, 15 AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Aug 2, 2011),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1 5/issue/22/australian-trade-policy-statement-
investor-state-dispute-settlement.
19. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement, AuST. GOV'T DEP'T OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/pages/isds.aspx (last visited Nov.
11, 2015). Note that some commentators disagree with the notion that Australia is
abiding by the case-by-case policy, asserting that Australia has instead reverted to the
inclusion of ISDS post-2013. See generally Luke Nottage, Investor-State Arbitration:
Not in the Australia-Japan Free Trade Agreement, and Not Ever for Australia?, U. OF
SYDNEY L. SCH. (2014), https://sydney.edu.aullaw/anjel/documents/2014/ZJR 38 05
Nottage_8.pdf. This explanation concludes that the Japan FTA of 2014 excluding
ISDS is merely an aberration. See id. at 39-42.
20. See Christoph Schreuer, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent
to Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 353, 354 (Claire
Balchin, ET AL. eds., 2010); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 71, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4
I.L.M. 524 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
21. See Schreuer, supra note 20; see also Press Release, International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Venezuela Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the
ICS1D Convention (Jan. 26, 2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages
/News.aspx?CID=57&ListID=74fl e8b5-96d0-4f~a-8fc-2f3a92d84773&variation=
en us.
22. See Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Bits: Impact on Investor-state
Claims, U.N CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (Dec. 2, 2010),
Vol. 5:3
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At the time, withdrawal by Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela seemed to
be a regional reaction to the fairness of what was viewed as a foreign-
imposed regime. When Bolivia withdrew, Bolivian President Evo Morales
said, "Governments from Latin America[,] and I think all over the world[,]
never win the cases. The transnationals always win., 23 Yet, this sentiment
does not appear to be factually grounded; in an empirical study of
investment treaty cases in 2008, Washington and Lee University Associate
Professor of Law Susan Franck24 recently found that governments won in
57.7% of cases whereas investors prevailed in only 38.5% of cases.25
C. Criticism after Philip Morris Asia v. Australia
Following the South American state repudiation of ISDS, the next wave
of criticism was led by the public in reaction to high-profile cases,
including Philip Morris' cases against Australia and Uruguay. Even in
current debate about ISDS, commentators complain that Philip Morris is
"trying to use ISDS to stop Uruguay from implementing new tobacco
regulations intended to cut smoking rates.26  Following Philip Morris,
public commentators continued to criticize investor-state arbitration when
27Vattenfall AB v. Germany was initiated in 2012. Vattenfall, a Swedish
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia201 6_en.pdf; see also Karsten Nowrot,
Termination and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, in SHIFTING
PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 233 (Steffen Hindelang & Markus
Krajewski eds., 2016).
23. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 49 (2008) (referring to newspaper article quoting
President Morales).
24. See generally Susan D. Franck, WASH. & LEE U. L. SCH.,
https://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=267 (last visited May 17, 2016).
25. See id; see also Susan D. Franck, Considering Recalibration of International
Investment Agreements: Empirical Insights, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS 73 (Jose E. Alvarez et al.
eds., 2011).
26. See Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should
Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-
the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-
bd I e- 11 e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html.
27. Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Notice of Arbitration
(May 31, 2012). Note that Vattenfall had previously filed a case against Germany in
2009 after a change in Hamburg's environmental regulations caused Vattenfall to claim
C 3.7 billion compensation based on increased expenses in a power plant that Vattenfall
was building. See generally Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6,
Award (Mar. 11, 2011). Interestingly, Vattenfall was the first case brought against a
Western European country under the Energy Charter Treaty-the prior twenty cases
were all brought by investors against the governments of Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union, and Turkey. See Cesare Romano, Vattenfall v. Germany.- Anomaly or
New Trend?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 6, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/200
9/05/06/vattenfall-v-germany-anomaly-or-new-trend/.
2016
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power company, initiated the case against Germany after the German
parliament amended the Atomic Energy Act in 2011 to speed up the phase-
out of nuclear energy, which required the immediate shutdown of nuclear
reactors operated by Vattenfall.28 This amendment followed the nuclear
disaster in Fukushima, Japan as public sentiment in Germany turned
against the use of nuclear energy.29  Critics of Vattenfall's claim have
called it the "exploitation" of "woolly definition of expropriation to claim
compensation for changes in government policy that happen to have
harmed their business.3 ° Similar to criticisms of the Philip Morris cases,
commentators have painted Vattenfall as an attack on environmental and
safety regulations.
Although Germany did not react against ISDS in response to Vattenfall,
other states limited or withdrew their participation in ISDS around the time
that the Philip Morris and Vattenfall cases were initiated. Like Australia's
reaction to the Philip Morris case, South Africa followed suit in 2012 by
stating that it would not provide for ISDS in future trade agreements.
31
Most recently, Pakistan rejected a U.S. draft BIT that contained ISDS
provisions from the U.S. Model BIT.32 Instead, Pakistan drafted its own
Model BIT under which Pakistan could not be held liable for disputes
involving private investors.
33
South Africa and Indonesia have gone further than Pakistan; these two
states have terminated existing BITs that include ISDS provisions. South
Africa began terminating treaties in 2012 after a two-year review of its
investment treaty obligations. The review followed ISCID arbitration by
investors from Luxembourg and Italy in response to South Africa's 2002
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act.34  In 2015, South
Africa went further by enacting legislation that does not permit investors to
28. See Nathalie Bemasconi-Osterwalder & Martin Dietrich Brauch, The State of




30. See The Arbitration Game, supra note 17.
31. See SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary,
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY at 55 (July 2012), http://www.iisd.org
/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/1 0/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf.
32. See Mehtab Haider, Pakistan refuses to accept US model on investment reaty,
THE NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/28990-
pakistan-refuses-to-accept-us-model-on-investment-treaty.
33. See Amin Ahmed, New bilateral investment treaty model, DAWN MEDIA GRP.
(Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.dawn.com/news/1 166720.
34. See Bilateral investment treaties in South Africa, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(July 2014), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/1 18456/
bilateral-investment-treaties-in-south-africa.
Vol. 5:3
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seek recourse through international arbitration.35  Indonesia has also
terminated the Netherlands-Indonesia BIT on its expiration date of July 1,
2015 with commentators proposing that recent investor-state arbitration
cases motivated the Indonesian Government to review its treaty portfolio.36
Indonesia has announced its intention to end all BITs so that those with
automatic renewal will be terminated, and the remainder will expire.37 But,
Indonesia has yet to terminate any other existing agreements.
38
D. Criticism in the United States: Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations
The public debate over ISDS reached the United States in 2015. The
conversation has focused on the ISDS provision of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership ("TPP"), a treaty negotiated by President Barack Obama with
eleven Pacific Rim nations.39 The text of the TPP was released fully to the
public on November 5, 2015 and signed by United States Trade
Representative Michael Froman on February 4, 2016.40 United States
Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat from Massachusetts, led the
conversation in early 2015 by accusing ISDS of being a "rigged, pseudo-
court" that permits multinational corporations "potentially to pick up huge
payouts from [U.S.] taxpayers.41 Senator Warren gained the support of
law and policy professors who explained how corporations use ISDS
arbitration to "challenge[] environmental, health, and safety regulations,
35. See New Treatment of Foreign Investors in South Africa, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 26,
2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-d4b6fc79-d34a-4581-8e9a-
6511 bcb3b8ad.
36. See Leon E. Trakman & Kunal Sharma , Why is Indonesia terminating its
bilateral investment treaties?, E. ASIA FORUM (Sept. 20, 2014),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/201 4/09/20/why-is-indonesia-terminating-its-bilateral-
investment-treaties/.
37. See Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Farewell Indonesia's BITs: economic
nationalism or sensible reform?, LEXOLOGY (July 7, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=cfD24d43-350e-40c4-8d 11-d235f86144fc.
38. See id. India has also announced its intention to review its BIT system to
consider excluding IDSD from future agreements. See Kyla Tienhaara, These TPP
safeguards won't protect us from ISDS, ABC (Mar. 26, 2015, 1:07AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-26/tianhaara-these-tpp-safeguards-wont-protect-
us-from-isds/6350358.
39. See generally The Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tpp/ (last viewed May 11, 2016). The other
participating nations are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Id.
40. The White House released the full text of the TPP on a special website on
November 5, 2015. See The Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited
May 11, 2015).
41. Warren, supra note 26.
2016
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including decisions on plain packaging rules for cigarettes, toxics bans,
natural resource policies, health and safety measures, and denials of
permits for toxic waste dumps.42  In addition to concerns for U.S.
legislative measures, Senator Warren and others have bashed ISDS for its
43
lack of independent judges and the absence of an appeal process.
If ratified, the TPP will be one of fifty agreements to which the United
States is a party that includes an ISDS provision.44 According to the United
States Trade Representative Froman, foreign investors rarely pursue
arbitration against the United States, and more importantly, they have never
been successful in arbitration against the United States.45
Still, Senator Warren and other critics not only fear that it is "a matter of
time" before the United States loses, but they also cite the resources that
states must expend on claim defense without the ability to sue
affirmatively.46 Senator Warren fears that the ISDS regime is only an
opportunity for multinational corporations to win at the expense of
American taxpayers and small businesses.4 7
E. Criticism in Europe: Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership Negotiations and Micula
Debate over ISDS is raging in Europe, mirroring the concerns raised in
the United States. In Europe, the culmination of the public debate on
investor-state arbitration could result in policymakers' decision to forego
investor-state arbitration provisions in future treaties.
On July 8, 2015, the European Union Parliament adopted a series of
recommendations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
48
("TTIP"), which included an amendment to the proposed ISDS provision.
The amendment calls to replace the ISDS with a new system "which is
subject to democratic principles and scrutiny" that requires "publicly
42. Chermerinsky Letter, supra note 1.
43. See id.; Warren, supra note 26.
44. See FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (la t visited May
11,2015).
45. Id.
46. Warren, supra note 26; see also Prof Chermerinsky Letter, supra note 1.
47. See Warren, supra note 26.
48. See EU Parliament Adopts TTIP Resolution, ISDS Compromise Language,
ICSID (July 9, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-parliament-
adopts-ttip-resolution-isds-compromise-language [hereinafter "EU Parliament ISDS
Compromise"]. Note that the United States is also a participant in the TT1P
negotiation. In the U.S. debate, some commentators focus their attention on TPP, see
Warren, supra note 26, while others attack both TPP and TTIP, see Chermerinsky
Letter, supra note 1.
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appointed, independent professional judges in public hearings" with an
appellate mechanism.49 As a result of the amendment, some policymakers
have concluded that "ISDS is dead.,
50
This new system is the European Commission's ("EC" or
"Commission") Investment Court System, which would apply to TTIP and
all other E.U. investment treaties.5' The EC has described the EC
Investment Court System as a permanent court with appointed judges that it
will set up with the assistance of other states. The EC envisions that this
system will replace the current ISDS arbitration system "over time" to
"further increase the efficiency, consistency and legitimacy of the
international investment dispute resolution system.,
52
But the EC's attacks on ISDS do not stop at treaty negotiations. It has
challenged the appropriateness of BIT-based ISDS between European
Union member states in an investor-state case. In an unprecedented move,
the EC prohibited a member-state from enforcing the award issued by an
ICSID tribunal in Micula v. Romania.5 3 In 2005, brothers loan and Viorel
Micula initiated a case against Romania under the Sweden-Romania BIT
after Romania withdrew economic incentives that harmed the Miculas'
food distribution business.54  Romania, with the support of the EC as
amicus curiae, argued in part that the ICSID tribunal should refuse
jurisdiction because Romania changed its laws for the purpose of
complying with European Union competition law when Romania acceded
55to the EU. Nevertheless, in 2013, the ICSID tribunal issued an award in
the Miculas' favor and ordered Romania to pay $250 million
compensation.56 An ad hoc ICSID committee refused to annul the award,
which Viorel Micula has been seeking to enforce in the United States and
Belgium.57 In May 2014, the EC issued an injunction to prevent Romania
49. EU Parliament ISDS Compromise, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission proposes new
Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and investment negotiations
(Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-5651_en.htm.
52. Id.
53. See generally Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award,
(Dec. 11, 2013).
54. See Douglas Thomson, EU Comes Down Against Micula Award, GLOBAL
ARB. REV. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33691/eu-
comes-down-against-micula-awa.
55. See generally Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 40-41 (Sept. 24, 2008).
56. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, 1329.
57. See Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment,
339 (Feb. 26, 2016); see also Alison Ross, Twin Brothers'Award Against Romania
Upheld, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Feb. 29, 2016), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/
2016
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from honoring the award.58 Following a six-month investigation, on March
30, 2015, the EC enjoined Romania from honoring the ICSID award on the
basis that it infringes EU law, which prohibits subsidies and ordered
Romania to recover any money already paid.59
The Miculas have brought a lawsuit against the Commission in the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") to overturn the injunction against
Romania. Each of the European Union's twenty-eight member-states i a
signatory to the ICSID Convention,60 which affords ICSID awards the
status of final judgments in the national courts of each signatory.
6
1
Therefore, in the ECJ proceeding, the Commission is arguing that intra-EU
BITs are incompatible with EU law.62 At least one commentator predicts
that this argument will succeed. If the prediction is correct, the
commentator believes it will be "a horrific outcome for investors and for
legal certainty" with negative repercussions in the global investment
arbitration system including "temptation for countries like Argentina not to
pay out ICSID awards."
63
F. Criticism from the Community ofArbitration Practitioners
The public debate regarding ISDS has identified inequities in the system,
including the lack of independent judges and absence of an appeals
process. 64  Politicians and academics are not the only commentators
concerned about he practical problems of the ISDS arbitration system.
The current TPP and TTIP public debates have been accompanied by
unprecedented professional criticism of the ISDS system from arbitration
"insiders." Insiders question opaque arbitrator appointment processes, the
revolving door between advocates and neutrals, and time constraints faced
by arbitrators. These criticisms pair with recent trends in arbitration
practice, including a growing number of arbitrator challenges, growing
number of dissents that appear to be based in ideology and challenges to
arbitral awards based on of arbitrator work delegation.
article/34779/twin-brothers-award-against-romania-upheld/.
58. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, 50.
59. See id. 75.
60. See generally ICSID Convention, supra note 20.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. (citing opinion of Nikoas Lavranos, Secretary-General of investment law
think-tank European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration). Note that
Argentina has ongoing obligations in spite of its withdrawal from ICSID. See
generally Argentina settles five investment reaty awards, ALLEN AND OVERY (Nov. 7,
2013), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Argentina-settles-five-
investment-treaty-awards.aspx.
64. See Warren, supra note 26; Chermerinsky Letter, supra note 1.
Vol. 5:3
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Former deputy and acting Secretary-General of ICSID Nassib Ziad and
practitioner Hamid Gharavi both recently published concerns about the
credibility of ICSID itself and its practices.65  The President of the
International Bar Association ("IBA"), David W. Rivkin, went beyond the
system as a whole, chastising arbitrators for failing to dedicate sufficient
time and attention to their cases in order to deliver fair and timely awards.
66
Messrs. Ziad6 and Gharavi explained concerns about the annulment
committee appointment process, codes of conduct for ICSID, and code of
conduct for arbitrators. First, Mr. Ziad agreed with practitioner Mr.
Gharavi that arbitrators who serve on ICSID tribunals should not be
appointed to annulment committees. He went further to say that ICSID
arbitrators should not act as counsel in ICSID arbitrations. The current
practice "creates at least a perception that annulment committee members
may be tempted to develop case law that would benefit their pending or
potential ICSID arbitration cases."
Second, the ICSID Secretary-General has enormous powers over the
annulment committee appointment process and influence over cases. Mr.
Ziad explained that appointments are made in violation of the ICSID
Convention because the chairman of the ICSID administrative council
(president of the World Bank), who is charged with the appointment,
"invariably" relied on the recommendation of the ICSID Secretary-General.
The present ICSID Secretary-General "routinely" proposes a list of
arbitrators from outside the ICSID panel of arbitrators even though Article
40(1) of the ICSID Convention requires the appointment from the panel.68
As Mr. Gharavi also noted, in practice, it is the ICSID Secretary-General
who makes all appointments, which is an extraordinary power.69  In
addition to appointment powers, ICSID secretaries-general have also
expressed their views about the appropriate scope of the annulment
mechanism, which can have an impact on proceedings when the ICSID
Secretary-General essentially has the exclusive power to appoint annulment
65. See Hamid Gharavi, ICSID Annulment Committees: the Elephant in the Room,
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 13, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/
33193/icsid-annulment-committees-elephant-room/; Nassib Ziad6, Is ICSID Heading in
the Wrong Direction?, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://globalarbitration
review.com/news/article/33574/is-icsid-heading-wrong-direction/. Mr. Ziad stated that
he avoided criticizing ICSID's practices for four years after he left his role there. He
published his recently article regretting "to say that [his] concerns have not abated in
the past four years."
66. See Douglas Thomson, Rivkin Calls for "New Contract" For Arbitrators and
Parties, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/
article/34255/rivkin-calls-new-contract-arbitrators.
67. See Ziad6, supra note 65.
68. See ICSID Convention, supra note 20, art. 40(1); Ziad6, supra note 65.
69. See Gharavi, supra note 65.
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committees.70  These recommendations echo those in the TIPP public
debate about independent judges.
Third, Mr. Ziad recommended that ICSID needs its own code of
conduct because staff members tend to have close "personal (if not family)
links" as well as professional connections to investment arbitration
professionals. For example, there is no internal guideline that would
prohibit ex parte communications about arbitration cases between party's
counsel and ICSID staff. ICSID should create a code of conduct and
guidelines for arbitrators and counsel as well. For example, unchallenged
arbitrators should have standard guidelines to decide a challenge against
their third arbitrator.
Finally, Mr. Ziad expressed the ultimate concern that ICSID seems
unwilling to improve the system: "I decided to speak out in the hope of
spurring a debate that the present leadership of ICSID seems to wish to
avoid.",
71
Turning to the arbitrators themselves, Mr. Rivkin recently called out
arbitrators in a keynote address at an arbitration conference in Hong
72Kong. Mr. Rivkin reprimanded arbitrators for failing to allow sufficient
time to hear and decide cases, to familiarize themselves with the facts of
disputes in advance, to exercise control over counsel, to schedule
deliberations soon enough after the hearing, and to deliver timely awards
that address the matters in issue.73  Observers praised Mr. Rivkin for
"telling it like it is."
74
G. Criticism of Practical Issues
Public concerns about the lack of independent judges in the ISDS system
find support in practical challenges that cast doubt on the neutrality of
arbitrators. First, a growing number of high-profile challenges to the
appointment of arbitrators creates an appearance of bias.75 The perception
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Thomson, supra note 66.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Notable recent examples include challenges against (1) Yves Fortier in Fdbrica
de Vidrios Los Andes, C.A. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/21, Reasoned
Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Arbitrator L. Yves Fortier (Mar. 28,
2016) and ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30,
Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier, Q.C., Arbitrator (Dec. 16,
2015); (2) Brigitte Stem in Highbury International v. Venezuela, ICS1D Case No.
ARB/14/10, Disqualification of Professor Brigitte Stem (Jan. 9, 2015); (3) Vaughan
Lowe QC in City-State N.V v. Ukraine, ICS1D Case No. ARB/14/9 (Sept. 18, 2015);
and (4) Teresa Cheng in Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision
on the Proposal to Disqualify Teresa Cheng (Aug. 26, 2015).
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exists that ideology affects the appointment process. Challenges rarely
succeed, which casts further doubt on the effectiveness of the appointment
process and the viability of the investor-state arbitration system. On
October 8, 2015, however, Alexis Mourre, President of the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") International Court of Arbitration,
communicated that the ICC will start communicating the reasons for its
76decisions on challenges to arbitrators. It remains to be seen whether such
increased transparency will alleviate the concerns.
Next, after an arbitrator survives any challenges to appointment, he or
she will ultimately be in a position to challenge the final award by writing a
dissenting opinion. Dissenting opinions are expressly permitted in ICSID
arbitrations pursuant to Article 48(4) of the ICSID Convention.77 The
recent proliferation of dissenting opinions, however, contributes to
suspicions that arbitrators are not neutral, particularly when dissenters were
almost always appointed by the losing party. In fact, nearly 100% of
dissents favor the party that appointed the dissenting arbitrator which raises
questions of arbitrator neutrality7 8
Skepticism of arbitrators' neutrality as dissents increase is further fed by
annulments of arbitral awards-at times based on the rationales given by
dissenting arbitrators. A prime example is the very recent annulment in
Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador ("Oxy") for reduction in damages of
$700 million, the largest amount ever annulled by ICSID, which partly
endorsed a dissent from one arbitrator.79 Reports indicate that arbitrator
76. See ICC Court to Communicate Reasons as a New Service to Users, INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2015/
ICC-Court-to-communicate-reasons-as-a-new-service-to-users/.
77. See ICSID Convention, supra note 20, art. 48(4).
78. See Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed
Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 823 (Mahnoush Arsanjani
ET. AL eds., 2011).
79. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 1,
Award (Oct. 5, 2012) [hereinafter "Oxy"]. In Oxy, the arbitrators agreed that Ecuador
inappropriately terminated its participation contract with Oxy for a 200,000-hectare oil
block after Oxy breached by "farming out" a 40% interest in the project to another
company without approval. Id. 363. The arbitrators disagreed about damages: the
majority decided that Oxy right to the oil block's $2.5 billion value should be reduced
by 25% for Oxy's failure to seek approval for the farmout. Id. 876-77. Arbitrator
Stern stated in her dissent that the majority's findings on damages were based on
"grossly incorrect legal bases," with its view on Oxy's farmout agreement with the
third-party "egregious." See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/1 1, Dissenting Opinion, 5 (Sept. 20, 2012). Stern agreed with Ecuador that
Oxy's right to the oil block's $2.5 billion worth should be reduced by forty percent, the
amount that Oxy sought to farm out to the third party, which was void due to its failure
to seek the required approval. See Oxy, supra note 73 876-77. See generally
Sebastian Perry, Ecuador Wins Record Reduction of Oxy Award, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Nov. 3, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/34298/ecuador-wins-
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Brigitte Stem's dissent "laid out a roadmap for Ecuador's annulment
arguments."80  The increasing number of annulments can rattle the
confidence of investors who are the users of investor-state arbitration.
When a string of awards were annulled by ICSID in 2010," some predicted
a "crisis of user confidence in the ICSID system." Concerns were then
allayed by a 5-year period without any annulments-until Oxy.
Finally, confidence in investor-state arbitration is undermined with
suspicions that arbitrators improperly delegate their duties to arbitral
secretaries. In Yukos v. Russia, Russia recently moved to set aside the
arbitral awards for the Tribunal's "impermissible delegation" of its
82mandate to decide the case. Russia submitted a forensic linguist's
conclusion that the arbitral secretary, Martin Valasek, wrote a large portion
of the final award, including much of the substantive analysis on the case.
83
In a system in which "writing" the decision is equivalent to "making" the
decision,84 Russia argued that this delegation is grounds for annulment of
the award. Although the award was set aside on other grounds,85 Russia's
challenge is likely to resonate with other international arbitration
professionals, who have voiced strong concerns about the time and
attention that arbitrators dedicate to their cases.
86
III. ISDS WILL SURVIVE
In the face of criticism from politicians, academics, states, and
professionals, the ISDS system will shake but not fall. The tide of criticism
may encourage states to reform ISDS provisions in future treaties, but most
state actions to date demonstrate that ISDS is here to stay.
87First, the United States maintained ISDS provisions in the TPP. The
record-reduction-oxy.
80. See Perry, supra note 79.
81. See, e.g., Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the
Award (June 29, 2010); Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010);
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment of Fraport AG Frankfurt
Airport Services Worldwide (Dec. 23, 2010).
82. See Alison Ross, Valasek Wrote Yukos Awards, Says Linguistic Expert,
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/34
234/valasek-wrote-yukos-awards-says-li.
83. See id.
84. Id. (quoting Klaus Peter Berger).
85. Joined cases C/09/477160 / HA ZA 15-1 and C/09/477162 / HA ZA 15-2, Rb.,
the Hague, 20 April 2016, (Russian Federation/Yukos Universal Limited).
86. See Thomson, supra note 66 (quoting IBA President David W. Rivkin).
87. See Luke Eric Peterson, A First Glance at the Investment Chapter of the TPP
Agreement: A Familiar US-Style Structure with a Few Novel Twists, INT. ARB. REP.
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agreement contains baby steps toward addressing concerns over a state's
power to legislate, including a footnote clarifying that expropriation
"depends on the totality of the circumstances, including whether the
relevant treatment distinguishes between investors or investments on the
basis of legitimate public welfare objectives.88  The agreement also
considers that future actions might improve transparency or provide for
appeals in ISDS arbitrations.89  Nevertheless, the agreement does not
include any revolutionary provisions on these issues.
Second, although Australia distanced itself from ISDS following Philip
Morris's filing of action in 2011, it has cozied back up to ISDS in recent
treaty negotiations. In all treaty agreements since 2013, Australia has
included an ISDS provision with only one exception. In fact, Australia
participated in the negotiations for TPP, which includes a relatively
traditional ISDS provision, as described above. And, Australian officials
are pushing the passage of TPP for the nation's economic future: the Prime
Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, has lauded TPP as a "gigantic foundation
stone for [Australia's] future prosperity."90
Australia's return to ISDS casts doubt on whether other states will
continue to keep their distance from ISDS. Indonesia, for example, also
appears to have stepped away from the system in 2015, but it has not
completely withdrawn from ICSID. Another state to watch is South Africa,
which has taken a unique approach to ISDS by permitting only state-state
arbitration in lieu of investor-state arbitration as of December 2015.91 Time
will tell if Indonesia and South Africa, like Australia, will return when
public debate quiets or when ISDS becomes useful in a treaty negotiation.
Finally, even the EC's actions do not put the final nail in the ISDS
coffin. The EC's proposed investment court represents a reform rather than




90. Daniel Hurst, Turnbull: Trans-Pacific Partnership 'a Foundation Stone for
Future Prosperity', THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/oct/06/tumbull-trans-pacific-partnership-a-foundation-stone-for-future-
prosperity.
91. See Jackwell Feris, Amended Investment Bill is Still a Concern, BDLIVE (Dec.
7, 2015). In December 2015, South Africa's Parliament passed The Protection of
Investment Bill, which represents a compromise between its former ISDS regime and a
no-arbitration regime. The first draft of the bill, released in 2013, caused an outcry by
precluding international arbitration by foreign investors in disputes with the state,
limiting recourse to domestic courts. The final bill provides that the government "may
consent" to international state-to-state arbitration when domestic remedies have been
exhausted. Rather than reject all international dispute resolution options, South Africa
has crafted a new tailored approach.
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a repudiation of ISDS.92 Reforms include (1) requirements that arbitrators
may not act as counsel or expert witnesses, (2) assignment of arbitrators at
random from a set roster, and (3) development of an appeal process.93 Yet,
in spite of the "court" terminology, the proposed system is compatible with
existing arbitration processes. The proposed system might be housed at
either ICSID or the Permanent Court of Arbitration.94  Further, awards




In 2015 and 2016, ISDS suffered an unprecedented wave of criticism
from public officials, academics, and arbitration professionals across the
globe in highly publicized debate. 96 The criticism spans from questions of
procedural fairness to concerns about the democratic power to legislate. In
response to this criticism, states will reform ISDS, but the system will
remain a crucial piece in international trade treaties. Critics hoping for the
demise of ISDS due to democracy concerns can take comfort that Philip
Morris Asia v. Australia continues a string of decisions upholding the
state's power to make legitimate policy decisions on behalf of its citizens.
While a government that clearly acts to protect its own industry through
discriminatory legislation may be sanctioned by an arbitral tribunal,9 7
tribunals have consistently upheld states' legitimate use of their police
powers, such as with respect to California's gasoline additive regulation in
92. See Luke Eric Peterson, Europe's Latest TTIP Investment Proposal Cloaks
Arbitration in Judicial Robe, Tightens Ethical Screws (Further), and Thinks Seriously
about Small Claims, INT'L ARB. REP. (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.iareporter.com/artic
les/analysis-europes- atest-ttip-investment-proposal -cloaks-arbitration-in-judicia -robe-
tightens-ethical-screws-further-and-thinks-seriously-about-small-claims/.
93. See id.; The Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 40.
94. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 40.
95. See id.
96. That criticism of ISDS is not new. For example, there have been criticisms
based on reasons related to a State's power to regulate, notably with respect to public
health and environment (see e.g., Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on
Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998)) where the Canadian Parliament acted to ban the import
and transport of a toxic gasoline additive). Other criticisms include the fact that
arbitrators are, by and large, commercial lawyers who are less likely to be mindful of
the public policy consequences of their awards for developing states than to the plain
reading of treaties devised by dominantly developed countries. See Gus Van Harten,
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIc LAW 122- 51 (Stephan W. Schill ed., Oxford University
Press, 2010). The magnitude of the current criticisms and the fact that ISDS is not an
obscure mechanism living outside the public eye is, however, novel.
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Methanex98 or Canada's agricultural pesticide regulation in Chemtura.99 In
these cases, like in Philip Morris, the arbitral tribunals dismissed investors'
claims in favor of legitimate government acts.
98. Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Aug. 9, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm.
99. Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/crompton.aspx?lang--eng.
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